To The Hon. W. H. Seward,
Washington, D. C.
New York, June 6, 1861
My Dear Sir,—In your last kind letter, you requested me to inform you, from time to time, of the phases of public opinion in Europe, as they may come to my knowledge. I shall do so with pleasure, but hope that you will excuse my request if I beg you to consider my communications as strictly confidential.
The letters received by last steamer from England are any thing but satisfactory. The cotton interest seems to have gained so complete an ascendency over every other consideration, that the anti-slavery feeling is entirely pushed into the background.
I fear that the British cabinet is seriously contemplating the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and what is worse is the almost certainty that France will act in concert with England.
If you will not take it amiss, I will make bold enough to give you, as my candid opinion, that the Morrill tariff has had as much to do with the unfortunate state of feeling in Europe as any other circumstance.
England and France are compelled to keep their army and navy on the most extensive war footing, both mistrusting each other. In order to obtain the enormous sums required for such a state of things, both governments must bring every sacrifice of principle rather than see their commercial and manufacturing interests endangered. Our tariff and our blockade strike a mortal blow to both, and as we cannot, of course, give up the latter, it is certainly worthy the serious consideration of our government and people to see whether sound policy does not dictate the modification of tlje first. Apart from the change of public feeling which a return to free-trade principles would produce in England and France, I think that we absolutely require it in order to increase our revenue, which, under the present system, must continue to be very low. The only interest, in my opinion, for which the plea of protection can be advanced with any degree of justice, is our iron interest, and that can be sufficiently done by a specific duty.
For the rest there ought, in my opinion, to be an average duty of fifteen per cent., and coffee and tea might be taken from the free list.
The government will very soon require a new loan, probably not less than thirty or forty millions, and I confess, candidly, that I do not see any chance for the negotiation of it in Europe, unless the chances of an increased revenue are secured by such a measure.
Before the war can be brought to a satisfactory termination we shall require from fifty to one hundred millions of dollars at least, and I think it will be absolutely necessary to look to the European money market for at least a portion of that amount.
By a reduction of our tariff to fifteen per cent., we take away a very great inducement for France and England to force our blockade and to recognize the South. They evidently expect now, not only to get their supply of cotton, but also to export their produce and manufactures into the Southern ports, to be from there smuggled into the West and North.
With a duty of fifteen per cent., the South cannot defray her expenses of a war, even if the blockade should not exist, and will be obliged to have recourse to an export duty on cotton and tobacco, and nothing will bring out a Union feeling so soon as that, among the influential planting interest.
Excuse the freedom of the expression of my views—they are based upon the best information I can command, abroad and at home, and they are dictated by a sincere devotion to my government.
