Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to Henry Adams
H.Q. Cav’y Escort, A. of P.
Before Petersburg, August 13, 1864
The life of Napier I finished some days ago. The English are getting to understand the art of biography for they let a man tell his own story and reflect his own character in his own words. Yet I don’t think that this biographer made the most of his subject. Sir William Napier’s life, like those of most literary men, had very little in it to make it interesting and could be made so only as reflecting the principles, manners and conversation of his times. Of these beyond his letters we get nothing in this work. Sir William Napier was a thinker and talker. He knew and conversed much with many noteworthy men, and yet his notes of conversations with Soult are all that these volumes supply from this source. The author is nothing of the Boswell and his work accordingly loses four-fifths of its value and interest.
Meanwhile here greater operations are going on than any which Napier undertook to describe, and it is really amusing to see how the developments of this war have antiquated all Napier’s military theories. I am very curious to get your later letters and to see what you have to say on these peace questions and intrigues. What a flutter and commotion among would-be negotiators, money-lenders and intriguers the publication of a leaf from your memoirs would create! As I watched the Sanders-Greeley fiasco in its developments I could n’t help thinking what a dust I might have kicked up on my arrival here last spring. How well that secret was kept; not a lisp of it apparently ever crept into any print; and yet, first and last, it must have come to the knowledge of many men. Now, I am so isolated here that I am curious to know how you look at these movements in the North and what degree of importance you attach to them. Of course it is, and will remain, a question of military success, but have these peace movements as yet developed any new strength? Except in point of numbers the McClellan meeting in New York was a great failure, as it could n’t muster even a fifth rate man to address an enormous audience. So far as I see the disciples of peace too are the old set and the old set only. They cannot get any new hands at the bellows. In spite of what you write I still do not see any symptoms of that powerful combination of fragmentary organisations which alone could defeat Lincoln. What with peace and War Democrats, Fremont men and McClellan men, it seems to me that more decisive disaster than any we have yet met will be necessary to drive the war party from power. How does this strike you? I really know nothing of the true posture of affairs, and anxiously wait for reliable news.
Meanwhile some gleams of real success seem actually to be shining upon our arms. Old Farragut seems to have called an emphatic halt on all re-enforcements to Hood, and the rebels seem to me to be playing our game by holding so fiercely on to Atlanta. Affairs in the southwest look undoubtedly prosperous. Mean while, since I wrote yesterday, symptoms of movements have developed themselves here — a sudden movement, the aim of which seems unknown to every one. After finishing my letter of yesterday I rode down to City Point and while there we suddenly heard that the 2d Corps was moving down, and almost immediately the head of its column came in sight. At once the question arose where were they going? The same question still remains unanswered. Hancock declared that he did n’t know; Colonel Walker, his Assistant Adjutant General, confessed utter ignorance; everyone was at fault. Half a dozen different destinations were at once suggested and canvassed. First came Washington. I think not; the enemy is retiring and Hancock ranks Sheridan. Grant would never have put Sheridan in command up there to immediately supersede him. Then came Acquia Creek. The same objection holds and Colonel Walker told me that they were to take no artillery with them. Besides, Barlow, who has been away on leave, suddenly returned last night, evidently having been sent for, which he would not have done had the Corps been going North. This morning we learn that three Brigades of cavalry will today cross the river with three days’ forage and rations. Can this be a combined movement north of the James? I think not. Such a movement by a single corps could scarcely be more than a diversion, and no operations requiring a diversion are contemplated here, where all is quiet. Besides, a large mass of transportation is accumulated at City Point. Finally, Mobile is suggested. I think wrongly, for the transports are not ocean vessels and are wholly unfit for so long a voyage. One other point of destination only is suggested and that is Wilmington. A sudden combined attack, that is possible. On this I have settled down my hopes. The wish may be father of the thought, but the very thought makes me happy. This place would carry out all that I have desired in all my late letters. To transport the troops by water would save time and all the expenditure of a terrible march in August. The enemy could have no clue as to where we were going and a coup de main, carried out with all Hancock’s dash, could hardly fail of success. By it we should once more carry the war into Africa; we should turn the line of the Roanoke and prevent Lee’s ever using it if driven from Virginia. We should effectually recall his troops from Maryland to attack this army or to defend North Carolina. We should decisively disable him from re-enforcing Hood, and finally, last not least, we would gladden all your hearts by inflicting the death blow on all blockade running. With Atlanta, Mobile and Wilmington in our hands I do not think the peace party could make much headway, or that we need fear to face the fall elections. Before this letter reaches you I suppose you will know in what direction this movement develops itself. I can’t help feeling sanguine. Grant is a man of such infinite resource and ceaseless activity — scarcely does one scheme fail before he has another on foot; baffled in one direction he immediately gropes round for a vulnerable point elsewhere — that I cannot but hope for great results the whole time. He has deserved success so often that he will surely have it at last. If I have divined his plan, it is certainly different from any which I had conceived in its details — different and much better. The movement by sea would be a great thing, both in deceiving the enemy and bringing our troops fresh to the scratch. The weak point in it would of course be in our position here. The enemy might move round and take our defences in reverse. Our works are very strong and we should have from 40 to 50,000 men to defend them; but our line is very long and, I should say, easily flanked. No attack in front would alarm us, but a bold flank movement by Lee’s whole army might give us a great deal of trouble. . . .
