Following the American Civil War Sesquicentennial with day by day writings of the time, currently 1863.

Post image for …, where skill is nearly equal and luck alone decides, the chances are ten to one against the assailant.

…, where skill is nearly equal and luck alone decides, the chances are ten to one against the assailant.

September 10, 2014

Adams Family Civil War letters; US Minister to the UK and his sons.

Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to his father

H.Q. 5th Mass. Cav’y
Pt. Lookout, Md., September 10, 1864

In the case of the last assault on Petersburg the troops behaved badly — that all confess; but I doubt if the world ever saw fiercer or more determined assaults than will be recorded in this war. There are limits to training, as to everything else, and when the fighting qualities of enemies are nearly equal and their strength not entirely disproportionate, the defensive will furnish advantages which no possible vigor, or determination, or training, unaided by skill or its equivalent luck, can enable an assaulting party to overcome. In such a case, where skill is nearly equal and luck alone decides, the chances are ten to one against the assailant. Probably the most famous assault in history was that of McDonald’s column at Wagram (I think). I doubt if it was more determined or better deserved success than Longstreet’s at Gettysburg. Read the campaigns of Frederick of Prussia. See how rarely he by direct assault carried positions — never when opposed by Daun, except once and then by pure luck when the day was lost. Look at Napoleon at Borodino. Marlborough was more successful. Malplaquet, in respect to defensive preparations and advantages of position, was more like our battles here than any old world action that I can call to mind; yet Marlborough carried it much as Grant carried Spottsylvania. It was a nominal victory. The same of the Crimea. The Malakoff was carried not by training but by skill and good fortune, and the English never carried the Redan at all. In Italy the same. Magenta and Solferino were not decisive victories, not more so than Antietam. You must bear in mind in reading our battles that the system of entrenching was never carried to such an extent and perfection as in this war. It is no longer an assault, like Waterloo, but we defend and attack fortified camps, using and meeting every improved weapon of modern warfare. I do not believe that training can do anything more for our troops. The question is now one of pure skill and endurance.

However, to drop the abstract and descend to the particular. What do the English think of Farragut? Of course, Semmes is their model; but is n’t Farragut in some essentials — such as skill and pluck — a trifle like Nelson and some of their naval heroes of the antiquated school? Semmes is a good man, and Paul Jones was a better, for Paul’s ship did n’t sink until after he had taken his adversaries. But on the whole I think I still rather prefer the Blake and Farragut school. Do our English friends see any merit in the reduction of the Mobile forts? If not, what do they say of the fall of Atlanta? How superbly Sherman — Sherman “the unlucky” — has handled that Army! It almost brings the tears into my eyes to read of the boldness, the caution, the skill, the judgment, the profound military experience and knowledge of that movement, all resulting in its brilliant success and condensed in that one immortal line, “So Atlanta is ours and fairly won.” Who shall say that to the enemy belongs all the skill? Why should not Sherman rank only second to Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon? I send you herewith the Army and Navy Journal that you may read its criticisms upon that campaign. Unquestionably it is the campaign of this war; not more brilliant or so complete as that of Vicksburg, but, viewed as a whole, with its unheard lines of supply and unceasing opposition, it rolls along like a sonorous epic. The enemy swarms on his flank and rear like mosquitos; they do not turn him back a day. They stand across his path, he rolls around them and forces them back. At rest he brings them to bay and when all observers shout “a deadlock,” lo! his cannon thunder in their rear and, astonished and demoralised, outgeneraled and outfought, they save themselves in confessed defeat. It is superb! Of the results, whether great or small, which will follow this fall of Atlanta, I don’t pretend to form any opinion. I only look at the campaign in an artistic point of view, as a poem. So viewed, to my mind it is perfect. I hope you will send me some English criticisms, particularly Russell’s in his “Army and Navy.” I am most curious to see how the English will view it. That they will try to give the palm to Hood, as they did to Semmes, I do not doubt, but I want to see how they go to work.

I can no longer give you any news of the Army of the Potomac. I have ceased to belong to it. I got here Thursday last and took command Friday evening. I have been received with a cordiality which has been most gratifying. Considering that I was commissioned over every one here, I somewhat expected at first some slight jealousy and coolness; but, on the contrary, my reception has borne every mark of gratification at my arrival. . . .

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