Monday, August 1st.
There is much speculation in the army as to the reason why the explosion of the mine did not accomplish what had apparently been expected of it, and bitter criticisms are freely indulged in by many of the officers and men at the loss, as we hear it reported, of from three to four thousand men with no compensatory result. The wildest rumors are in circulation, one being that General Grant had no confidence in the scheme and at the time of the explosion was actually playing cards with General Rawlings at City Point. Another is that owing to the reported strained relations between Generals Meade and Burnside, the former did not wish the mine, which was on Burnside’s front, to prove a success, and that after the fiasco he pretended to be very much disappointed and actually put Burnside in arrest, Grant countermanding the arrest as soon as he heard of it. Yet another is that Burnside is to be dismissed and Meade removed. Still another is that some of the general officers charged with the execution of the plan showed the white feather, and failed to lead their men to the assault as they should have done. There is no place in the world where gossip prevails to the extent that it does in an army in the field, and in the countless and conflicting statements of fact which seem to have acquired currency, I very much doubt if the true history of the causes which led to the failure of the mine is ever written. But whatever the real facts may have been, it is my individual opinion that if there had been an officer in supreme command, who kept himself in close touch with all parts of the line and knew the exact situation as it existed at the more important points, and so had been able promptly to take advantage of any favorable opportunities suddenly and unexpectedly arising, any disaster occurring at one point could and would have been retrieved by an overwhelming success at another point.
