Following the American Civil War Sesquicentennial with day by day writings of the time, currently 1863.

War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies

STEAMER BALTIC,
New York, April 19, 1861.

SIR: I sailed from New York in this vessel Tuesday morning, the 10th instant, having dispatched one steam-tug, the Uncle Ben, the evening previous to rendezvous off Charleston. The Yankee, another chartered tug, followed us to the Hook, and I left instructions to send on the Freeborn.

We arrived off Charleston the 12th instant, at 3 a.m., and found only the Harriet Lane. Weather during the whole time a gale. At 7. a.m. the Pawnee arrived, and, according to his orders, Captain Rowan anchored twelve miles east of the light, to await the arrival of the Powhatan. I stood in with the Baltic to execute my orders by offering, in the first place, to carry provisions to Fort Sumter. Nearing the bar it was observed that war had commenced, and, therefore, the peaceful offer of provisions was void.

The Pawnee and Lane immediately anchored close to the bar, notwithstanding the heavy sea, and though neither tugs or Powhatan or Pocahontas had arrived, it was believed a couple of boats of provisions might be got in. The attempt was to be made in the morning, because the heavy sea and absence of the Powhatan’s gunboats crippled the night movement. All night and the morning of the 13th instant it blew strong, with a heavy sea. The Baltic stood off and on, looking for the Powhatan, and in running in during the thick weather struck on Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The heavy sea, and not having the sailors (three hundred) asked for, rendered any attempt from the Baltic absurd. I only felt anxious to get in a few days’ provisions to last the fort until the Powhatan’s arrival. The Pawnee and Lane were both short of men, and were only intended to afford a base of operations whilst the tugs and three hundred sailors fought their way in.

However, the Powhatan and tugs not coming, Captain Rowan seized an ice schooner and offered her to me, which I accepted, and Lieutenant Hudson, of the Army, several Navy officers, and plenty of volunteers agreed to man the vessel, and go in with me the night of the 13th. The events of that day, so glorious to Major Anderson and his command are known to you. As I anticipated, the guns from Sumter dispersed their naval preparations excepting small guard-boats, so that with the Powhatan a re-enforcement would have been easy. The Government did not anticipate that the fort was so badly constructed as the event has shown.

I learned on the 13th instant that the Powhatan was withdrawn from duty off Charleston on the 7th instant, yet I was permitted to sail on the 9th, the Pawnee on the 9th, and the Pocahontas on the 10th, without intimation that the main portion–the fighting portion–of our expedition was taken away. In justice to itself as well as an acknowledgment of my earnest efforts, I trust the Government has sufficient reasons for putting me in the position they have placed me.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX.

The Baltic has been chartered for one month.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War, Washington.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, April 19, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. KEYES, Secretary to the General-in-Chief Washington, D. C.:

COLONEL: I respectfully report for the consideration, and I hope for the approval, of the General-in-Chief the reasons inducing me to urge on Captain Meigs and Lieutenant Porter a delay in forcing an entrance into the harbor of Pensacola. Aware of the desire of the Government that a ship should be placed there, and knowing that I was opposing the wishes of Captain Meigs, nothing but a profound sense of its necessity would have induced interference on my part; but, believing if the actual state of this post at this time were known that no such instructions would have been given, I did not hesitate to express my views and wishes in the case.

As I have already reported to you, I found this post in the worst possible condition for hostilities–the batteries out of order; some of the largest and most important guns dismounted; the necessary traverses and other protections for the troops unprepared; the garrison deficient; the subsistence nearly exhausted; the ammunition (except powder) not sufficient in important articles for one day’s service; a total want of Engineer, Quartermaster, and Ordnance tools and implements, and the fort in a complete state of confusion, all requiring the labor of every man in it; the steamer Atlantic lying here with large supplies of indispensable stores, which can only–without extreme inconvenience, involving great time and labor–be landed within range of the guns of Fort McRee, and the vital importance of getting these stores ashore, rendered, in my judgment, delay in encountering hostilities of the utmost importance, and any act of ours provoking, or I may say assuredly and certainly causing it, to be premature and unwise.

Time with us is everything, and I can see but little injury accrue from delay. I cannot and will not see the flag of my country fired on without returning the fire, and I am desirous not to be placed in this category until I am able efficiently to defend myself and assail the enemy, which now I cannot do.

I desire that my remarks on the condition of the fort may not be considered as reflecting in the slightest degree on my predecessors in command. To Lieutenants Slemmer and Gilman too much praise cannot be awarded for their energy, zeal, and perseverance in keeping this post–a truly forlorn hope–and I trust they will receive the reward their gallantry merits. To Brevet Major Tower, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Whittemore very great praise is due for associating themselves voluntarily with Slemmer in the day of his darkest hour, and for their efficiency in assisting the defense. Captain Vogdes had been in command but a few days, and had done everything during that time that his means permitted.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosures.]

U. S. TROOP-SHIP ATLANTIC, OFF SANTA ROSA,
April 18, 18611 a.m.

Col. H. BROWN, Commanding Expedition:

DEAR SIR: It is so quiet to-night that I think it quite important to make use of the opportunity to land all the men possible, and as I find that the boats carry more than we expected, and one-half of Mr. Hildt’s company is already on shore, I have ventured to use some discretion and land the rest of his company with Major Hunt’s. This leaves only the battery to be landed to-morrow with their horses. We will request the fleet to cover the landing of the horses and battery, and you can send a company of infantry to their assistance should it appear that it is best to place them east of the fort. This can only be determined after a reconnaissance of the island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Captain, U. S. Engineers.

U. S. TROOP-SHIP, ATLANTIC, April 18, 1861.

Col. HARVEY BROWN, Commanding Department of Florida:

DEAR SIR: I advise you to call upon Captain Adams to send a sailing ship to Key West to order up the Crusader with two companies of infantry and such stores as they can spare. The Wyandotte from long service, without time for repairs, is liable to break down at any moment, and the Crusader will be very useful in her place. The zeal and energy of her commander in this cause, too, will tend much to your advantage. The three companies left at Fort Taylor will be able to hold that place against all opposers. When relieved the Wyandotte might go to Key West to report, but at present, at any risk, she must be kept here. Let the carpenters make wagon-bodies as soon as possible. We will, by the Wyandotte, send boats to the nearest landing-place. Captain Barry says his horses are strong enough to be used.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Captain of Engineers.

P. S.–I will bring mattresses for the carpenters from the boat. They should be encamped and kept in good humor. They are more valuable than soldiers just now.

U. S. STEAMSHIP POWHATAN, OFF PENSACOLA,
April 18, 1861.

Col. H. BROWN, U. S. Army, Commanding Fort Pickens, Florida:

DEAR SIR: In looking carefully over the orders of the President in relation to my entering the harbor, I find them so imperative that they leave no margin for any contingency that may arise. Your letter to Captain Meigs, of the 13th, requesting me not to go in and draw the fire on you before you had time to prepare, is quite sufficient to satisfy me that any such course on my part would be very indiscreet, but, to satisfy the authorities in Washington, I would be obliged to you if you would address me a little more fully on the subject, and state as near as you can your actual condition, and the time required to make up deficiencies. If you think that in two days’ time you will be ready for me to make the attempt, please notify me, for after that time I shall have to run the gauntlet by moonlight, which would no doubt be a good time for an exhibition, but darkness would suit better for a piece of strategy. I know that I am here to give you aid and comfort, and keep any of the enemy from crossing over in boats on the inside, but while I will do all I call in the way of aid, I cannot do much in cutting off boats where I now am. Will you please make such suggestions as your good sense will dictate, and I will endeavor to follow them as near as I can.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
U. S. Navy

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, April 18, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. KEYES, Secretary to the General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:

COLONEL: We arrived off this place on the evening of the 17th instant, having encountered a heavy norther on the passage from Tortugas. I immediately sought and obtained an interview with Captain Adams, commanding the naval forces here, who promised me every assistance in his power, and boats to land my command. I decided to land with a part of my force without delay, and while preparing to land, signal rockets from Fort Pickens, indicating an expected attack, hastened our departure. I got in the fort at 2 o’clock yesterday morning with the Sappers and Miners and a part of Clitz’s company. Our arrival probably prevented the contemplated attack. I found in the fort, besides the two companies of artillery, a detachment of one hundred marines and sailors. The greater portion of them I have sent back to the ships. In the course of yesterday and to-day all the troops and horses have landed, and a very small portion of stores, the landing of which in the surf is a slow operation.

In going over the fort and examining its condition, the miserable state of its armament, the small supply of ammunition and stores, I am almost discouraged at the task before me. The mounted guns are few in number—two 10-inch shell guns, four 8-inch howitzers, seventeen 32-pounders,  and seven 18 and eleven 12 pounders. The guns are generally indifferent, and the carriages old and not to be depended on.

I have not been able to ascertain the exact force of the secessionists, but so far as I can learn their force is nearly 7,000 men. Their forts are fully armed, Fort McRee having, it is said, one hundred heavy guns. Fort Barrancas’ guns are not so heavy, and they have, besides, several heavy batteries, so that every face but one of this fort is taken in reverse, and if they take possession of Santa Rosa, which with my force I cannot prevent, they can erect batteries so as to enfilade every face.

I cannot too strongly urge the importance of the heavy rifled guns, with their carriages, for which I have estimates, sent without a moment’s delay, though how we are to get them ashore in the face of an enemy I cannot now say.

I am now impressed with my inability to return, even moderately, a fire for any considerable time, and the entrance of the Powhatan will certainly cause a collision for which I am unprepared. I have urged Captain Meigs to defer his entrance until we are better prepared. A collision at this moment would embarrass me exceedingly in unloading the ship and getting my supplies ashore, and we are so short of all necessaries that they are of the first importance. In the face of the heavy batteries she will have to encounter, I very much doubt the possibility of the Powhatan getting in by daylight, though I may be mistaken. The odds against her are fearful.

I thought it advisable to inform the secession general of the position in which I stand, so I sent to him a flag of truce with the letter marked A, to which he returned no answer, only remarking to the bearer, Captain Vogdes, that in re-enforcing this fort I had broken the truce.

It is reported to me that until the day Captain Vogdes entered the fort communication by mail was allowed, they inspecting the letters, and forwarding such as they pleased and retaining the others; but since then no letters are forwarded either to or from this post. The post-office should be transferred to this place, and an officer appointed postmaster.

I have my whole force employed in mounting guns, making roads, preparing quarters, and unloading the steamer. Many traverses are indispensably necessary for the protection of the men and guns in case of a bombardment, and I have not been able for want of tools and sand bags even to commence them. In two days I think I shall be able to make a respectable defense against the combined force of the forts and batteries, and to inflict more injury than I shall receive.

I found affairs in Key West tending to so favorable an issue that a part of the forces there may be spared. I have, therefore, ordered two companies of infantry to proceed in the Crusader, which Captain Adams has kindly authorized me to use, to this post. When they arrive and those in the Illinois, I shall be so strong as to defy the taking of this fort by assault, whatever may be the force brought against it. I think these companies should be replaced by two others if they can be spared.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosure A.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, Fla., April 17, 1861.

Brig. Gen. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commanding Troops of Confederate States near Pensacola, Fla.:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I have arrived at this post, and that I shall, unless assailed, act only on the defensive, and make only such disposition of my threes as is necessary to protect them from any enemy, foreign or domestic. I have also to inform you that no movement of the troops of my command or of United States vessels in this vicinity will have any other than a defensive object, unless we shall unhappily be compelled to act offensively, repelling aggression against the flag, persons, or property of our country.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 3.
Extract

HDQRS. DEP’T OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, April 18, 1861.

Fort Pickens is hereby announced as the headquarters of the Department of Florida:

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

By order of Colonel Brown:

GEO. L. HARTSUFF,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

April 17.–Arrived in New York.

The following observations may be made upon the bombardment: The enemy’s fire on the second day, the 13th, was more rapid and more accurate than on the previous day. It seemed to be directed at the embrasures, and to set the quarters on fire. The latter object was fully attained, but not the former, for only two embrasures were struck–one at the right gorge angle by the rifled shot mentioned above, and the other at the left shoulder angle by a shot from the so-called floating battery, which struck the shutter, but without destroying it or entering the throat of the embrasure. The attempt to form a breach at the right gorge angle only succeeded in breaching around one embrasure to the depth of twenty-two inches, and in knocking off a large piece of one cheek, but without disabling the gun or rendering the embrasure inefficient. The barbette tier was not much injured by the second day’s firing, none of the guns being dismounted by it; and few of them struck. The fire, however, destroyed all the gun carriages and splinter-proof shelters on the gorge.

After the cessation of fire, about six hundred shot-marks on the face of the scarp wall were counted, but they were so scattered that no breached effect could have been expected from such fire, and probably none was attempted except at the right gorge angle. The only effect of the direct fire during the two days was to disable three barbette guns, knock off large portions of the chimneys and brick walls projecting above the parapet, and to set the quarters on fire with hot shot. The vertical fire produced more effect, as it prevented the working of the upper tier of guns, which were the only really effective guns in the fort, being columbiads, 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, and 42-pounders principally, and also prevented the use of the columbiads arranged in the parade to be used as mortars against Cummings Point. The shells that struck the stair towers nearly destroyed them, and filled the stairways with so much rubbish as to render them almost impassable. This, with the destruction of the stairs at the gorge by the explosion of the magazine of shells by the fire, made it almost impossible to get to the terre-plein.

The burning of the quarters and barracks produced a great effect on the defense while the fire lasted, inasmuch as the heat and smoke were almost stifling, and as the fire burned all around the magazines, obliging them to be closed, and thus preventing our getting powder to continue the firing. It also destroyed the main gates and the gun carriages on the parapet of the gorge. But we could have resumed the firing as soon as the walls cooled sufficiently to open the magazines, and then, having blown down the wall left projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced. In fact, it would have been better if the chimneys, roofs, and upper walls of the quarters and barracks had been removed before the firing begun, but the short notice and the small force did not permit anything of this kind to be done after the notice of the attack was received.

The weakness of the defense principally lay in the lack of cartridge bags, and of the materials to make them, by which the fire of our batteries was, all the time, rendered slow, and towards the last was nearly suspended. The lack of a sufficient number of men to man the barbette tier of guns at the risk of losing several by the heavy vertical fire of the enemy also prevented us making use of the only guns that had the power to smash his iron-clad batteries, or of throwing shells into his open batteries, so as to destroy his cannoneers.

The want of provisions would soon have caused the surrender of the fort, but with plenty of cartridges the men would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and if necessary much longer, on pork alone, of which we had a sufficient supply.

I do not think that a breach could have been effected in the gorge at the distance of the battery on Cummings Point, within a week or ten days; and even then, with the small garrison to defend it, and means for obstructing it, at our disposal, the operation of assaulting it, with even vastly superior numbers, would have been very doubtful in its results.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. FOSTER,

Captain, Engineers.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL ARMY, C. S. A.,
Charleston, S.C., April 17, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit by Col. R. A. Pryor, one of my aides (who like the others was quite indefatigable and fearless in conveying my orders, in an open boat, from these headquarters to the batteries during the bombardment), a general report of the attack of the 12th instant on Fort Sumter. This report would have been sent sooner if my other pressing duties had permitted me to devote my time to it, while the presence of the enemy’s fleet still led us to expect an attack along the coast at any moment. A more detailed account will be sent forward as soon as the returns of the commanders of batteries shall have reached this office. The great difficulty I will labor under will be to do full justice to all when so much zeal, energy, and gallantry were displayed by officers and soldiers in the execution of my orders. I wish, however, to record two incidents, which will illustrate the feelings that animated all here.

Whilst the barracks in Fort Sumter were in a blaze, and the interior of the work appeared untenable from the heat and from the fire of our batteries (at about which period I sent three of my aides to offer assistance in the name of the Confederate States), whenever the guns of Fort Sumter would fire upon Fort Moultrie the men occupying Cummings Point batteries (Palmetto Guard, Captain Cuthbert) at each shot would cheer Anderson for his gallantry, although themselves still firing upon him, and when on the 15th instant he left the harbor on the steamer Isabel the soldiers of the batteries on Cummings Point lined the beach, silent, and with heads uncovered, while Anderson and his command passed before them, and expressions of scorn at the apparent cowardice of the fleet in not even attempting to rescue so gallant an officer and his command were upon the lips of all. With such material for an army, if properly disciplined, I would consider myself almost invincible against any forces not too greatly superior.

The fire of those barracks was only put out on the 15th instant, p.m., after great exertions by the gallant fire companies of this city, who were at their pumps night and day, although aware that close by them was a magazine filled with thirty thousand pounds of powder, with a shot-hole through the wall of its anteroom.

I am now removing the tottering walls of the buildings within, and clearing away all the rubbish, &c., from the interior of the work, so as to render it still more formidable than it was before it was attacked.

In one or two days I will send forward to you photographs taken at different points of sight, from which you can clearly understand the condition of the fort within when first occupied by us.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Hon. L. P. WALKER,

Secretary of War, Montgomery, Ala.

PENSACOLA, April 17, 1861.

Hon. L. P. WALKER:

Large steamer with troops joined the fleet last night. Send me instructed officers of Artillery for my batteries.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

—–

PENSACOLA, April 17, 1861.

Hon. L. P. WALKER:

Another naval steamer arrived to-day. Col. Harvey Brown and several hundred men landed. Colonel B. informs me he will hold himself on the defensive.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

HEADQUARTERS SURGEON-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT,
Charleston, April 16, 1861.

SIR: From the returns received from the various posts I have the unexampled and happy privilege of stating that no serious casualty has occurred during the vigorous action of thirty-three hours in reducing Fort Sumter. Four trifling contusions are reported at Fort Moultrie, but none at other posts, and it is a subject of equal gratification that even in the management of heavy ordnance by new recruits and unpracticed volunteers no accident to life or limb has occurred.

Immediately upon the flag of Fort Sumter being struck I proceeded to that fortress to tender my assistance and hospital at Mount Pleasant to Major Anderson, and received from him the pleasing intelligence that only four cases of slight injuries had resulted to his men. On Sunday a sad casualty occurred in saluting his flag, when the explosion of some loose cartridges beneath a gun struck down seven men. One was instantly killed, and another so seriously wounded that he died soon after reaching my hospital in Charleston; one remaining in the hospital, doing well under the care of Prof. G. G. Chisolm, of the medical college of the State, and four were removed with the garrison. The precipitation suddenly of several regiments upon me during the past few days, totally without any preparation of their surgeons, has required a large supply of medicines, instruments, hospital stores, &c., but I am happy to say they have received promptly all their requisitions.

Respectfully,

R. W. GIBBES,  M.D.

Surgeon-General South Carolina Army.

Adjutant-General JONES.

FLA., April 16, 1861.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the East:

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 14th instant it was reported to me that a small boat had landed at the wharf with a flag of truce, and that the bearer solicited an interview with the commanding officer of the post. I requested Lieutenant Slemmer, of the First Artillery, to accompany me, and repaired to the wharf. On my arrival the gentleman bearing the flag informed me that he was the bearer of a message from General Bragg, and that he was his adjutant-general. He then inquired whether I was the commanding officer of the fort. I replied that I was. He then stated that he was directed by General Bragg to inquire why the armistice in respect to re-enforcing Fort Pickens had been violated by throwing re-enforcements into it. I replied that I had never been a party to any armistice; that I had been sent by the General Government to take command of the post, and had entered under the orders of the General Government. He then addressed himself to Lieutenant Slemmer, and stated that he was directed to inquire of the former commanding officer why the armistice had been violated, to which Lieutenant Slemmer replied that he always obeyed the orders of his superiors. This ended our official interview. After exchanging the usual civilities customary among gentlemen previously acquainted, we parted, and Colonel Wood left the post. I would mention that Lieutenant Ingraham, formerly of the Marine Corps, was present during the interview as a witness on the part of Colonel Wood, and that Lieutenant Slemmer, at my request, performed the same duty on my part.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. VOGDES,
Captain, First Artillery, Commanding Fort Pickens.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL ARMY, C. S. A.,
Charleston, S.C., April 16, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following summary statement of the circumstances of the surrender of Fort Sumter: —

On the refusal of Major Anderson to engage, in compliance with my demand, to designate the time when he would evacuate Fort Sumter, and to agree meanwhile not to use his guns against us, at 3.20 o’clock in the morning of the 12th instant I gave him formal notice that within one hour my batteries would open on him. In consequence of some circumstance of delay the bombardment was not begun precisely at the appointed moment, but at 4.30 o’clock the signal gun was fired, and within twenty minutes all our batteries were in full play. There was no response from Fort Sumter until about 7 o’clock, when the first shot from the enemy was discharged against our batteries on Cummings Point.

By 8 o’clock the action became general, and throughout the day was maintained with spirit on both sides our guns were served with skill and energy.  The effect was visible in the impressions made on the walls of Fort Sumter. From our mortar batteries shells were thrown with such precision and rapidity that it soon became impossible for the enemy to employ his guns en barbette, of which several were dismounted. The engagement was continued without any circumstance of special note until nightfall, before which time the fire from Sumter had evidently slackened. Operations on our side were sustained throughout the night, provoking, however, only a feeble response.

On the morning of the 13th the action was prosecuted with renewed vigor, and about 7½ o’clock it was discovered our shells had set fire to the barracks in the fort. Speedily volumes of smoke indicated an extensive conflagration, and apprehending some terrible calamity to the garrison I immediately dispatched an offer of assistance to Major Anderson, which, however, with grateful acknowledgments, he declined. Meanwhile, being informed about 2 o’clock that a white flag was displayed from Sumter I dispatched two of my aides to Major Anderson with terms of evacuation. In recognition of the gallantry exhibited by the garrison I cheerfully agreed that on surrendering the fort the commanding officer might salute his flag.

By 8 o’clock the terms of evacuation were definitely accepted. Major Anderson having expressed a desire to communicate with the United States vessels lying off the harbor, with a view to arrange for the transportation of his command to some port in the United States, one of his officers, accompanied by Captain Hartstene and three of my aides, was permitted to visit the officer in command of the squadron to make provision for that object. Because of an unavoidable delay the formal transfer of the fort to our possession did not take place until 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 14th instant. At that hour, the place having been evacuated by the United States garrison, our troops occupied it, and the Confederate flag was hoisted on the ramparts of Sumter with a salute from the various batteries.

The steamer Isabel having been placed at the service of Major Anderson, he and his command were transferred to the United States vessels off the harbor.

The urgency of immediate engagements prevents me from giving at present a more circumstantial narrative of the incidents connected with the capture of Fort Sumter. When the reports from the various commanders of batteries are received I will hasten to forward you a more detailed account.

In conclusion, I am happy to state that the troops, both officers and soldiers, of the Regulars, Volunteers, Militia, and Navy, by their energy, zeal, perseverance, labor, and endurance before the attack, and by their courage and gallantry during its continuance, exhibited all the characteristics of the best troops; and to my staff, Regular and Volunteer, I am much indebted for the prompt and complete execution of my orders, which had to be communicated in open boats during the bombardment to the different batteries then engaged.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Hon. L. P. WALKER,

Secretary of War, Montgomery, Ala.

MONTGOMERY,

April 16, 1861.

Hon. L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War, Montgomery:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement in relation to my recent visit to Pensacola to your attention:

I left Washington City on the morning of April 7, with a communication from the Secretary of the Navy to Captain Adams, of the United States ship Sabine, and was informed by the Secretary that I would have no difficulty in making the communication to Captain Adams under the existing agreement. I arrived at Pensacola on the morning of the 11th instant, announced myself to Mr. LeBaron as an officer of the U. S. Navy, who sent an officer with me to General Bragg. I informed General Bragg that I had come from Washington, and desired to communicate with Captain Adams, of the Sabine. He wrote me a pass authorizing me to go to the Sabine, and upon handing it to me he asked if I had dispatches for Captain Adams. I replied that I had not written ones, but that I had a verbal communication to make to him from the Navy Department. I then asked him if I would be permitted to land on my return towards Washington. He replied that I would, provided Captain Adams or myself did nothing in violation of the agreement existing between them. I remarked that I knew nothing of the agreement he mentioned. I then left General Bragg and went to the navy-yard, from whence I embarked for the Wyandotte about 4 o’clock p.m. On reaching her I was informed by her commander that he could not carry me out to the Sabine that night, in consequence of the strong wind and rough sea on the bar.

During that evening Lieutenant Slemmer, of Fort Pickens, came on board, and I had a few moments’ social conversation with him. I had no dispatches for him whatever, and I gave him no information as to the nature of the communication which I had to make to Captain Adams. Of course he knew, as did every officer on board, that I came from the Navy Department to communicate with Captain Adams. On the next morning, the 12th instant, while waiting for the sea to subside on the bar, so that the Wyandotte could go out, one of the officers suggested that we should go on shore and take a look at Fort Pickens, to which I assented. We accordingly, about 9 o’clock a.m., landed there, and walked about the ramparts for half an hour, and then returned on board. During my visit to the fort I did not see Lieutenant Slemmer, as he was asleep and I did not desire to disturb him, as I had no object in seeing him, except to pay him the proper visit of courtesy on going within the limits of his command.

At about 10.30 or 11 o’clock a.m. the Wyandotte went out of the harbor and put me on board the Sabine, somewhere near 12 o’clock. I made my communication to Captain Adams, and stated to him what General Bragg had said in relation to the agreement between them. He, nevertheless, gave me a written order to return to Washington as “special messenger,” which order you have. Of course I proceeded to obey the order, and was landed by the Wyandotte at Pensacola about 5 o’clock p.m. I was told by Captain Adams that it was not necessary for me to see General Bragg on my return, and therefore I did not stop at his quarters.

I make this statement, ready with the solemnity of an oath to be confirmed. It is made, not with regard to personal safety, or of any consequences that might result to me personally, but purely in defense of my honor as an officer and a gentleman. Several officers in the Confederate service–among them I will mention Capt. D. N. Ingraham and Surg. W. F. Carrington–I think I can appeal to with confidence.

I respectfully submit this statement to the consideration of the honorable Secretary of War.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. WORDEN,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.