Diary of Gideon Welles

May 14, Thursday. I wrote, two or three weeks since, a letter to Admiral Du Pont of affairs at Charleston and his reports, but have delayed sending it, partly in hopes I should have something suggestive and encouraging, partly because Fox requested me to wait, in the belief we should have additional information. Du Pont is morbidly sensitive, and to vindicate himself wants to publish every defect and weakness of the ironclads and to disparage them, regardless of its effect in inspiring the Rebels to resist them, and impairing the confidence of our own men in their invulnerability. I have tried to be kind and frank in my letter, but shall very likely give offense.

Had a little conversation to-day with Chase and Bates on two or three matters, but the principal subject was Earl Russell’s speech.

May 13, Wednesday. The last arrival from England brings Earl Russell’s speech on American affairs. Its tone and views are less offensive than some things we have had, and manifest a dawning realization of what must follow if England persists in her unfriendly policy. In his speech, Earl R., in some remarks relative to the opinions of the law officers of the Crown on the subject of mails captured on blockade-runners, adroitly quotes the letter of Seward to me on the 31st of October, and announces that to be the policy of the United States Government, and the regulation which governs our naval officers. It is not the English policy, nor a regulation which they adopt, reciprocate, or respect, but the tame, flat concession of the Secretary of State, made without authority or law. The statement of Earl R. is not correct. No such orders as he represents have issued from the Navy Department. Not a naval officer or district attorney has ever been instructed to surrender the mails as stated, nor is there a court in the United States which would regard such instructions, if given, as good law. It is nothing more nor less than an attempted abandonment, an ignominious surrender, of our undoubted legal rights by a Secretary of State who knew not what he was about. The President may, under the influence of Mr. Seward, commit himself to this inconsiderate and illegal proceeding and direct such instructions to be issued, but if so, the act shall be his, not mine, and he will find it an unhappy error.

But Seward has been complimented in Parliament for giving away to our worst enemy his country’s rights, —for an impertinent and improper intermeddling, or attempt to intermeddle, with and direct the action of another Department, and the incense which he has received will tickle his vanity.

Sumner tells me of a queer interview he had with Seward. The first part of the conversation was harmonious and related chiefly to the shrewd and cautious policy and management of the British Ministry, who carefully referred all complex questions to the law officers of Her Majesty’s Government. It might have been a hint to Seward to be more prudent and considerate, and to take legal advice instead of pushing on, wordy and slovenly, as is sometimes done. Allusion was made to Mr. Adams and his unfortunate letter to Zerman.[1] Our Minister, Mr. Adams, was spoken of as too reserved and retiring for his own and the general good. Sumner said, in justification and by way of excuse for him, that it would be pleasanter and happier for him if he had a Secretary of Legation whose deportment, manner, and social position were different, — if he were more affable and courteous, in short more of a gentleman, — for he could in that case make up for some of Mr. A.’s deficiencies. At this point Seward flew into a passion, and, in a high key, told Sumner he knew nothing of political (meaning party) claims and services, and accused him of a design to cut the throat of Charley Wilson, the Secretary of Legation at London. Sumner wholly disclaimed any such design or any personal knowledge of the man, but said he had been informed, and had no doubt of the fact, that it was the daily practice of Wilson to go to Morley’s, seat himself in a conspicuous place, throw his legs upon the table, and, in coarse language, abuse England and the English. Whatever might be our grievances and wrong, this, Sumner thought, was not a happy method of correcting them, nor would such conduct on the part of the second officer of the Legation bring about kinder feelings or a better state of things, whereas a true gentleman could by suavity and dignity in such a position win respect, strengthen his principal, and benefit the country. These remarks only made Seward more violent, and louder in his declarations that Charley Wilson was a clever fellow and should be sustained.

I read to Attorney-General Bates the letters and papers in relation to mails on captured vessels, of which he had some previous knowledge. He complimented my letters and argument, and said my position was impregnable and the Secretary of State wholly and utterly wrong.

Mr. Seward sent me to-day a letter from Lord Lyons concerning the Mont Blanc and the Dolphin, and wished me to name some person at Key West to arbitrate on the former case, the vessel having been restored and the parties wanting damages. I named Admiral Bailey for this naval duty, but took occasion to reiterate views I have heretofore expressed, and especially in my letter yesterday that these matters belonged to the courts and not to the Departments.

Hear of no new move by Hooker. I am apprehensive our loss in killed and prisoners was much greater in the late battle than has been supposed.

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[1] Zerman was a Mexican in partnership with Howell, an American. The firm fitted out a vessel to trade with Matamoras. Mr. Adams, being satisfied of their good faith, gave them assurances of immunity from interference on the part of the United States Navy, and this discrimination against Englishmen engaged ostensibly in the same trade, was sharply criticized in the British Parliament.

May 12, Tuesday. We have information that Stonewall Jackson, one of the best generals in the Rebel, and, in some respects, perhaps in either, service, is dead. One cannot but lament the death of such a man, in such a cause too. He was fanatically earnest, and a Christian but bigoted soldier.

A Mr. Prentiss has presented a long document to the President for the relief of certain parties who owned the John Gilpin, a vessel loaded with cotton, and captured and condemned as good prize. There has been a good deal of outside engineering in this case. Chase thought if the parties were loyal it was a hard case. I said all such losses were hard, and asked whether it was hardest for the wealthy, loyal owners, who undertook to run the blockade with their cotton, or the brave and loyal sailors who made the capture and were by law entitled to the avails, to be deprived. I requested him to say which of these parties should be the losers. He did not answer. I added this was another of those cases that belonged to the courts exclusively, with which the Executive ought not to interfere. All finally acquiesced in this view.

This case has once before been pressed upon the President. Senator Foot of Vermont appeared with Mr. Prentiss, and the President then sent for me to ascertain its merits. I believe I fully satisfied him at that time, but his sympathies have again been appealed to by one side.

Mr. Seward came to my house last evening and read a confidential dispatch from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, relative to threatened difficulties with England and the unpleasant condition of affairs between the two countries. He asked if anything could be done with Wilkes, whom he has hitherto favored, but against whom the Englishmen, without any sufficient cause, are highly incensed. I told him he might be transferred to the Pacific, which is as honorable but a less active command; that he had favored Wilkes, who was not one of the most comfortable officers for the Navy Department. I was free to say, however, I had seen nothing in his conduct thus far, in his present command, towards the English deserving of censure, and that the irritation and prejudice against him were unworthy, yet under the peculiar condition of things, it would perhaps be well to make this concession. I read to him an extract from a confidential letter of J. M. Forbes, now in England, a most earnest and sincere Union man, urging that W. should be withdrawn, and quoting the private remarks of Mr. Cobden to that effect. I had read the same extract to the President last Friday evening, Mr. Sumner being present. He (Sumner) remarked it was singular, but that he had called on the President to read to him a letter which he had just received from the Duke of Argyle, in which he advised that very change. This letter Sumner has since read to me. It is replete with good sense and good feeling.

I have to-day taken preliminary steps to transfer Wilkes and to give Bell command in the West Indies. It will not surprise me if this, besides angering Wilkes, gives public discontent. His strange course in taking Slidell and Mason from the Trent was popular, and is remembered with gratitude by the people, who are not aware his work was but half done, and that, by not bringing in the Trent as prize, he put himself and the country in the wrong. Seward at first approved the course of Wilkes in capturing Slidell and Mason, and added to my embarrassment in so disposing of the question as not to create discontent by rebuking Wilkes for what the country approved. But when, under British menace, Seward changed his position, he took my position, and the country gave him great credit for what was really my act and the undoubted law of the case. My letter congratulating Wilkes on the capture of the Rebel enemies was particularly guarded and warned him and naval officers against a similar offense. The letter was acceptable to all parties, — the Administration, the country, and even Wilkes was contented.

It is best under the circumstances that Wilkes should be withdrawn from the West Indies, where he was sent by Seward’s special request, unless, as he says, we are ready for a war with England. I sometimes think that is not the worst alternative, she behaves so badly.

May 11, Monday. The President sent a note to my house early this morning, requesting me to call at the Executive Mansion on my way to the Department. When there he took from a drawer two dispatches written by the Secretary of State to Lord Lyons, in relation to prize captures. As they had reference to naval matters, he wished my views in regard to them and the subject-matter generally. I told him these dispatches were not particularly objectionable, but that Mr. Seward in these matters seemed not to have a correct apprehension of the duties and rights of the Executive and other Departments of the Government. There were, however, in this correspondence allusions to violations of international law and of instructions which were within his province, and which it might be well to correct; but as a general thing it would be better that the Secretary of State and the Executive should not, unless necessary, interfere in these matters, but leave them where they properly and legally belonged, with the judiciary. [I said] that Lord Lyons would present these demands or claims as long as the Executive would give them consideration, — acquiesced, responded, and assumed to grant relief, — but that it was wholly improper, and would, besides being irregular, cause him and also the State and Navy Departments great labor which does not belong to either. The President said he could see I was right, but that in this instance, perhaps, it would be best, if I did not seriously object, that these dispatches should go on; but he wished me to see them.

When I got to the Department, I found a letter from Mr. Seward, inclosing one from Lord Lyons stating that complaint had been made to his Government that passengers on the Peterhoff had been imprisoned and detained, and were entitled to damages. As the opportunity was a good one, I improved it to communicate to him in writing, what I have repeatedly done in conversation, that in the present state of the proceedings there should be no interference on his part, that these are matters for adjudication by the courts rather than for diplomacy or Executive action, and until the judicial power is exhausted, it is not advisable for the Departments to interfere, etc. The letter was not finished in season to be copied to-day, but I will get it to him to-morrow, I hope in season for him to read before getting off his dispatches.

May 8, Friday. A telegraph dispatch this morning from Admiral Porter states he has possession of Grand Gulf. The news was highly gratifying to the President, who had not heard of it until I met him at the Cabinet-meeting.

Several of our navy and army officers arrived this day from Richmond, having left that place on Tuesday to be exchanged. They all say that Richmond might have been captured by Stoneman’s cavalry, or by a single regiment, the city had been so thoroughly drained of all its male population to reinforce Lee, and so wholly unprepared were they for a raid that but little resistance could have been made. Stoneman and his force have done gallant service, but we regret they did not dash into Richmond and capture Davis and the Rebel Administration.

Commander Drayton came to see me to-day. He is one of Du Pont’s intimates, a man of excellent sense and heart, but is impressed with Du Pont’s opinions and feelings. All of Du Pont’s set — those whom he has called around him — are schooled and trained, and have become his partisans, defer to his views, and adopt his sentiments. It is his policy, and of course theirs, to decry the monitors as if that would justify or exonerate Du Pont from any remissness or error. I told Drayton it was not necessary to condemn the monitors for the failure to capture Charleston, nor did it appear to me wise to do so, or to make any deficiencies in those vessels prominent in the official reports which were to be published. It seems an effort to impute blame somewhere, or [as] if blame existed and an excuse or justification was necessary, of which the public and the whole world should be at once informed. If the monitors are weak in any part, there was no necessity for us to proclaim that weakness to our enemies; if they needed improvements, the Government could make them. Alluding to Du Pont’s long dispatch refuting, explaining, and deprecating the criticism in a Baltimore paper, I told him I was sorry to see such an expenditure of time, talent, and paper by the commander of the Squadron and his subordinates. Drayton expressed his regret at the over-sensitiveness of Du Pont, but said it was his nature, and this morbid infirmity was aggravated by his long continuance on shipboard. It is the opinion of Drayton that Charleston cannot be taken by the Navy and that the Navy can do but little towards it. He says the monitors, though slow, would have passed the batteries and reached the wharves of Charleston but for submerged obstructions.

May 7, Thursday. Our people, though shocked and very much disappointed, are in better tone and temper than I feared they would be. The press had wrought the public mind to high expectation by predicting certain success, which all wished to believe. I have not been confident, though I had hopes. Hooker has not been tried in so high and responsible a position. He is gallant and efficient as commander of a division, but I am apprehensive not equal to that of General-in-Chief. I have not, however, sufficient data for a correct and intelligent opinion. A portion of his plan seems to have been well devised, and his crossing the river well executed. It is not clear that his position at Chancellorsville was well selected, and he seems not to have been prepared for Stonewall Jackson’s favorite plan of attack. Our men fought well, though it seems not one half of them were engaged. I do not learn why Stoneman was left, or why Hooker recrossed the river without hearing from him, or why he recrossed at all.

It is not explained why Sedgwick and his command were left single-handed to fight against greatly superior numbers — the whole army of Lee in fact — on Monday, when Hooker with all his forces was unemployed only three miles distant. There are, indeed, many matters which require explanation.

May 6, Wednesday. We have news, via Richmond, that Stoneman has destroyed bridges and torn up rails on the Richmond road, thus cutting off communication between that city and the Rebel army. Simultaneously with this intelligence, there is a rumor that Hooker has recrossed the river and is at Falmouth. I went to the War Department about noon to ascertain the facts, but Stanton said he had no such intelligence nor did he believe it. I told him I had nothing definite or very authentic, — that he certainly ought to be better posted than I could be, — but I had seen a brief telegram from young Dahlgren, who is on Hooker’s staff, dated this A.M., “Headquarters near Falmouth —All right.” This to me was pretty significant of the fact that Hooker and his army had recrossed. Stanton was a little disconcerted. He said Hooker had as yet no definite plan; his headquarters are not far from Falmouth. Of course nothing farther was to be said, yet I was by no means satisfied with his remarks or manner.

An hour later Sumner came into my room, and raising both hands exclaimed, “Lost, lost, all is lost!” I asked what he meant. He said Hooker and his army had been defeated and driven back to this side of the Rappahannock. Sumner came direct from the President, who, he said, was extremely dejected. I told him I had been apprehensive that disaster had occurred, but when I asked under what circumstances this reverse had taken place, he could give me no particulars.

I went soon after to the War Department. Seward was sitting with Stanton, as when I left him two or three hours before: I asked Stanton if he knew where Hooker was. He answered, curtly, “No.” I looked at him sharply, and I have no doubt with incredulity, for he, after a moment’s pause, said, “He is on this side of the river, but I know not where.” “Well,” said I, “he is near his old quarters, and I wish to know if Stoneman is with him, or if he or you know anything of that force.” Stanton said he had no information in regard to that force, and it was one of the most unpleasant things of the whole affair that Hooker should have abandoned Stoneman.

Last night and to-day we have had a violent rainstorm from the northeast. Fox and Edgar, my son, left this A.M. for Falmouth. The President, uneasy, uncomfortable, and dissatisfied with the meagre information and its gloomy aspect, went himself this evening to the army with General Halleck.

May 5, Tuesday. But little of importance at the Cabinet. The President read a brief telegram which he got last evening from General Hooker, to whom, getting nothing from the War Department, he had applied direct to ascertain whether the Rebels were in possession of the works on the heights of Fredericksburg. Hooker replied he believed it was true, but if so it was of no importance. This reply communicates nothing of operations, but the tone and whole thing — even its brevity — inspire right feelings. It is strange, however, that no reliable intelligence reaches us from the army of what it is doing, or not doing. This fact itself forebodes no good.

Sumner came in this afternoon and read to me from two or three documents — one the late speech of the Solicitor of the Treasury in the British Parliament on the matter of prize and prize courts — which are particularly favorable to our views in the Peterhoff case. From this we got on to the absorbing topic of the army under Hooker. Sumner is hopeful, and if he did not inspire me with his confidence, I was made glad by his faith. The President came in while we were discussing the subject, and, as is his way, at once earnestly participated. His suggestions and inferences struck me as probable, hopeful, nothing more. Like the rest of us, he wants facts; without them we have only surmises and surmises indicate doubt, uncertainty. He is not informed of occurrences as he should be, but is in the dark, with no official data, which confirms me in the belief that the War Department is in ignorance, for they would not withhold favorable intelligence from him, yet it is strange, very strange. In the absence of news the President strives to feel encouraged and to inspire others, but I can perceive he has doubts and misgivings, though he does not express them. Like my own, perhaps, his fears are the result of absence of facts, rather than from any information received.

May 4, Monday. Great uneasiness and uncertainty prevail in regard to army movements. I think the War Department is really poorly advised of operations. I could learn nothing from them yesterday or to-day. Such information as I have is picked up from correspondents and news-gatherers, and from naval officers who arrive from below.

I this P.M. met the President at the War Department. He said he had a feverish anxiety to get facts; was constantly up and down, for nothing reliable came from the front. There is an impression, which is very general, that our army has been successful, but that there has been great slaughter and that still fiercer and more terrible fights are impending.

I am not satisfied. If we have success, the tidings would come to us in volumes. We may not be beaten. Stoneman[1] with 13,000 cavalry and six days’ supply has cut his way into the enemy’s country, but we know not his fate, farther than we hear nothing from him or of him. If overwhelmed, we should know it from the Rebels. There are rumors that the Rebels again reoccupy the intrenchments on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, but the rumor is traceable to no reliable source.

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[1] General George Stoneman was conducting an extensive cavalry operation intended to cut off Lee’s army after its expected defeat. The unlooked-for discomfiture of the Federal forces placed Stoneman in considerable danger, but he succeeded in rejoining Hooker’s main army on May 1st.