War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, April 22, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. KEYES, Secretary to the General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:

COLONEL: I wrote you on the 19th, detailing my proceedings to that time. Having sent my dispatches by a sailing vessel, I herewith inclose duplicates.

Since my last the weather has been generally favorable, and we have been busily employed in putting the fort in a condition of defense, and in landing provisions and other stores. I have made quite as good progress as I could have expected. The steamship Atlantic will be discharged to-day, when I shall send her to New York. The Illinois arrived yesterday, and landed Brooks’ and Allen’s companies, Second Artillery, and a detachment of recruits, so that I have now at this post nine full companies; aggregate about eight hundred and sixty men. I have also sent to Key West for the two infantry companies there. My present command is more than sufficient to repel any assault that may be made on the fort, but the holding the western portion of this island and preventing the rebels making a lodgment on it is of vital importance, and to do so effectually a larger force than I now have is required. If the assistance of the ships could always be insured, my present force might perhaps suffice, but they are constantly liable to be blown off, and may be so for several days, of which an enterprising and numerous enemy might and probably would avail himself. The presence of a large force here also prevents the secessionists from weakening their force, and thus prevents diversion to other places where their presence would be more unwelcome. I propose, as soon as I can put the fort in a defensive state, to throw up field works. No. 1, about one and a half miles from the fort, to be garrisoned by Barry’s battery and two foot companies; No. 2, about the same distance in advance, to be defended by two or three foot companies, leaving five or six for the garrison of the fort. I shall then strongly urge on Captain Adams, commanding the naval forces, the necessity of keeping his ships, or at least two of them, so close to the shore as to be able to rake the island. I have already so requested, and it has been in part complied with, but great reluctance is felt in placing sailing ships so near the shore. It gives me pleasure to state that I have received from the Navy very valuable assistance, which has been cheerfully and cordially rendered.

The work in the fort is progressing rapidly under the supervision of Major Tower and Captain Vogdes. Having now established something like system, I hope very soon to have it in fighting order. Guns are now being mounted, and traverses for the protection of the works and men being made; but there is an immense work to do. Our prospects are daily brightening, and I hope very soon to be in a situation to act both offensively and defensively. My command is in excellent health, and the men cheerful and in fine spirits. With such officers and such men I have nothing to fear from any number of rebels. Although most of my stores have been landed in full view and within range of the guns of Fort McRee, yet no hostile demonstration has been made; all has been quiet. I cannot at all account for their not taking possession of the island during the term of Lieutenant Slemmer’s command, its importance being so great and so evident; nor can I account for their abstaining to take the fort, their number rendering its success almost certain, unless from a reluctance on their part to commence hostilities, or their not being prepared for it. I think their present peaceful attitude arises from a consciousness of our ability to greatly distress them by destroying the navy-yard and by closing the port, while they can only hope to do us partial injury by a long and fruitless bombardment.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, April 22, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. KEYES, Secretary to the General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:

COLONEL: Since writing my dispatches, I have seen newspaper extracts announcing the secession of Virginia, the taking Fort Sumter and Gosport navy-yard. Should this news be true the security of Key West and Tortugas might be jeopardized. I have therefore countermanded my order for bringing two companies from Key West here, and I shall urge Captain Adams to keep a ship at Tortugas and one at Key West, in position to protect the works at these places.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

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U. S. TROOP-SHIP ATLANTIC, SANTA ROSA,
April 22, 1861.

Col. H. BROWN, Commanding Military Department of Florida, Fort Pickens :

DEAR SIR: If the news sent to Major Hunt by Colonel Bragg be correct as reported to me by Captain Porter, it becomes necessary to look for means to guard your communications and the most important posts of Key West and Tortugas against a naval enterprise. If the State of Virginia has really rebelled, and surprised the Gosport navy-yard, she has some good vessels, and she will very soon have officers to fight them, as Virginians will follow the fortunes of their native State. I do not think, then, that the two companies ordered up from Key West should now be withdrawn from that place. I think that the Sabine and St. Louis, useless here, should go, one to Key West and one to Tortugas, and be moored in position to aid in the occupation and defense  of these harbors. The letter of the President of 1st April, which you bear, and which Captain Adams has seen, gives you full and ample authority to call upon him to make this disposition of his ships.

The expedition under your command embraces the coast and islands of Florida in its scope, and your attention was particularly called to the “even greater importance” of Forts Taylor and Jefferson than of Fort Pickens. The value of all these posts is greatly increased if the news referred to be correct. I would call upon Captain Adams, in virtue of the authority in you vested by the President, to “co-operate” by sending these ships to Key West and Tortugas. The Crusader will be very useful here, the sailing ships there. Here you need steamers, and sailing ships, except as depots, are useless. From his present position it would take Captain Adams half a day in good weather to bring his guns into play, and in bad weather he could not move at all.

The team road should be extended up the island to the landing. The sailors are hard worked and should be spared rowing. The plank between the gate and dock would make the road. Now less than ever would I put this precious material on the Atlantic and Illinois at peril of destruction by a rough, drunken volunteer’s shot. If one of these ships is struck by such a shot, apologies will not restore her. Too little work was done yesterday on ship and shore.

I inclose a copy of your letter of the 17th instant to me, which I handed to Captain Porter indorsed, as you will see. By this I succeeded in stopping him.

I am, very truly and respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Captain, Engineers, Chief Engineer.

P. S.–This ship, if properly supplied with boats, can sail by 1 p.m. to-day.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, Fla., April 22, 1861.

Bvt. Maj. L. G. ARNOLD,
Commanding Fort Jefferson, Tortugas:

MAJOR: News has been received here that Virginia has seceded and Gosport navy-yard taken. If so, several large ships have fallen into the hands of the secessionists, and your post may be jeopardized. I shall try to get a ship stationed near to support you, but every effort must be made to strengthen your position as much as possible. Mount all the guns you can, and keep your whole force at work until all is finished that your means may permit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Pickens, Fla., April 22, 1861.

Bvt. Maj. L. G. ARNOLD,
Commanding Fort Jefferson:

MAJOR: At my request Captain Adams, commanding the naval forces at this place, has ordered the ship St. Louis to be stationed off your fort in such a manner as to give you necessary aid and protection. He is  also required to render you assistance in any manner that you may require, consistently with the safety of his vessel.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
April 20, 1861.

Col. L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General:

COLONEL: I inclose you a report of Lieutenant Slemmer in relation to an attempt of the seceders to bribe and seduce the garrison from their duty. That the attempt was made is fully proved by the fact that the money paid to Private McGarr is now actually in the possession of Lieutenant Slemmer. This noble fidelity should be rewarded, but the kind of reward I am not prepared to yet recommend. The design was to spike the flank casemate howitzer, and then to take the work by escalade. I have no doubt but that other soldiers of Lieutenant Slemmer’s garrison were tampered with, and I fear in one or two cases successfully, but have not yet had time to investigate the affair.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY BROWN,
Brevet Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

FORT PICKENS, FLA., April 18, 1861.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army:

SIR: Having had my suspicions aroused by letters passing to and from Fort Pickens and the village of Warrington, I issued orders that no letters or packages should be sent from or received at the post except those passing through my hands. Subsequent to this a roll of papers came from Warrington, addressed to Ordnance Sergeant E. H. Broady. Upon opening them a letter fell out, of which the following is a copy:

BROADY: You are without exception the dam’dest fool I have the pleasure of knowing. Bragg will give you a dam’d sight better berth than you have, and besides, you will be on the right side. Don’t be a jackass always. Look at Gardner–see his position. I have authority for offering you a like commission. Answer me. Where can I take you a cocktail? My regards to Flynn. Come over and see me. I can assure you that permission to visit your wife, and in a capacity she will be more than glad to find you in, will be granted you. No humbug. Come over.

Yours,

B.

I kept this letter, determining to watch the sergeant and intercept other letters. The next day another roll of papers came to the same address, out of which the following note was obtained:

What a jackass you are. I again renew my offer of a position with a lieutenant’s commission and all your pay twofold that is due you from the Federal Government. Also to Flynn. If you will help us along to save bloodshed, I can offer any private in the company $500, and any non-commissioned officer $1,000 too, with a guarantee of future provision as high or higher as he now stands. Every man who will take upon themselves to give us the fort without bloodshed, and save the lives of your garrison, will be well paid–all back pay, $500 for the privates, $1,000 for non-commissioned officers, and a commission in the Confederate army. This, Broady, I offer from authority. I would not offer it otherwise. You as a friend I believe will trust me. We must and will have the fort, but ’tis not worth one drop of blood; but if it cost 5,000 lives we must and will have it. Fill it full of Federal troops if you will, yet we must and will have it. Don’t be a dam’d fool. When and where can I see you? I will go over to-night, and will take a cocktail if you say so.

Answer first opportunity.

Yours, &c.,

B.

The same day I received private information that the troops on the opposite side were making preparations, preparing boats, &c., and intended to come over that night or the next. I immediately addressed a note to Captain Adams, commanding the squadron, informing him of the fact, and requested re-enforcements. A storm prevented the Wyandotte from coming out the harbor that night. I kept my men in position, keeping a strict watch on the sergeant. Nothing occurred. The next day I received a letter from Captain Adams, of which the following is a copy:

U. S. FRIGATE SABINE,
Off Pensacola, April 11, 1861.

Lieut. A. J. SLEMMER,
Commanding Fort Pickens, Fla.:

SIR: You have stated in your communication to me of the 10th instant, that from information received through private hands you have reason to believe that the safety of the fort depends on its immediate re-enforcement. Will you be pleased to lay this information in full before me? So many unfounded rumors have been in circulation to this same effect that it is necessary to be cautious, and my orders are positive not to land re-enforcements unless the fort is actually attacked or preparations are making to attack it. Should your information be such as to justify it, I will have re-enforcements landed as soon as practicable when the state of the sea will admit of boats landing outside the harbor and at night, as you recommend.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. A. ADAMS,
Captain, Senior Officer Present.

A storm prevented the steamer Wyandotte from returning to the squadron that night. On the morning of the 12th I made the following answer:

FORT PICKENS, FLA., April 12, 1861.

Capt. H. A. ADAMS, Commanding Squadron off Pensacola Harbor:

SIR: In reply to your communication of the 11th instant, I have to state the information I received is through varied sources, and all to the same effect, viz, that the troops were preparing to embark for this island, and that boats and material were ready at the navy-yard to start at any moment; that the intention was to land either last night or the night before. The weather having been such these nights that they could scarcely cross unless very determined, they may be expected at the first favorable opportunity. I have deemed my information of such importance that for the last two nights my men have been placed at the guns in readiness to repel an attack. My men and officers are much fatigued, and I deem it absolutely necessary that the fort should be re-enforced immediately. Provisions should also be landed while there is yet time to do so by the Wyandotte.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. J. SLEMMER,
First Lieutenant, First Artillery, Commanding.

On the night of the 12th instant, Captain Adams having received instructions from the Navy Department, Captain Vogdes landed with his company and the marines from the vessels, and relieved me from the command of the post. On the morning of the 11th instant I sent Ordnance Sergeant Broady on board the frigate Sabine, as I deemed it very unsafe to keep him in the fort, even if a good man, subject to the seductive influences I knew to be at work upon him. On the morning of the 13th instant a private of my company, G, First Artillery, Owen McGarr, came to me and made the following statement:

I was on picket guard last night. During the night I saw a small boat approach the beach. I stepped back to see what it was about, when a man came before me. I brought my musket to a charge and ordered him to halt. He said, “Don’t shoot; I am a friend.” He then began to talk to me and ask about the fort. While he was talking three others came up behind me. They asked me many questions, asking me about the number of men, &c., about the flank defense, whether the guns could not be spiked, &c. Said they would give any man plenty of money if he would only spike the flank defense guns. Asked when I would be on picket guard again. I told them on Monday night. They said, “We will be over and ready.” As they were going away one said to me, “How are you off for money in the fort? “‘ I said, ” We have not been paid for six months.” He then put a roll of bills in my hand and said, ” Give that to them.”

He then gave me a roll of bills, in amount sixty dollars. I have it now in my possession. There are evidences that the intention was to bribe my men to spike the flank defense and thus obtain possession of the fort.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

A. J. SLEMMER,
First Lieutenant, First Artillery.

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 24.

I. All intercourse hereafter with Santa Rosa Island, Fort Pickens, or the United States fleet, is strictly prohibited.

II. Martial law is declared to exist and will be rigidly enforced on all territory within five miles of the lines of this army.

By command of Brigadier-General Bragg:

ROBERT C. WOOD, JR.,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS TROOPS STATIONED AT KEY WEST,
Fort Taylor, April 20, 1861.

Maj. L G. ARNOLD, Commanding Fort Jefferson, Tortugas :

MAJOR: In order to further the views contained in your letter of the 1st instant, received to-day, I have been with Lieutenant Morton, Engineer Corps, to the town of Key West, for the purpose of giving my personal guarantee that any negroes he may be able to engage for labor at your post will not be removed therefrom for any purpose whatever without the consent of their owners, and I further offered to obtain yours to  the same effect should they be allowed to be sent. It is not necessary for me to allude to the reason of this unless its propriety should hereafter be questioned.

In regard to the force employed at Fort Taylor, I have not yet had time to see Captain Hunt, but fear that the lateness of the season, which takes the white laborers north, and the excitement in town regarding the capture of the black force at your post, will be difficulties not readily to be overcome.

You are correct in ascribing to me a general desire to promote the good of the service, which is, as it has always been, the uppermost thought in my action.

I am, major, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,
Brevet Major, U. S. Army, Commanding

U. S. TROOP-SHIP ATLANTIC,
Off Santa Rosa, April 20, 1861.

Col. H. BROWN, Commanding Department of Florida :

DEAR COLONEL: If my estimate is correct you have now about 690 men inside Fort Pickens. The Illinois is here with two companies, say 168. The Saint Louis has gone to order up two companies of infantry from Key West, say 154. You have then here 858; coming up, 154; total 1,012 The Sabine crew is 450. Powhatan 300; Brooklyn 300; Wyandotte, 75; total, 1,125. Crew of the Saint Louis, 250; Crusader, 100; Minnesota, 600; total, 950. Total force to be concentrated about Fort Pickens subject to your orders, 3,087.

The soldiers will have six months’ supplies as soon as the Illinois is discharged. Now, what to do with them? I agree with you in regard to the great importance of avoiding everything that will bring on a collision as long as possible. The policy of the Government I understand to be to hold, occupy, and possess what we now have, and not to produce collision if it can be avoided; in no case to fire the first hostile gun. The attack upon Fort Pickens must be made by bombardment or cannonade. I believe that it is impossible to land a force upon this island in face of the batteries of the Powhatan, Brooklyn, and Wyandotte, properly placed, without exposing it to sudden and swift destruction. If your men and means are all concentrated in Fort Pickens, every shell which enters the fort will tell its tale of destruction. To concentrate all these appears to me to be like putting the depot of a besieging army in the ricochet and breaching batteries. I think that the true mode of treating is that which regulates the advance batteries of a siege.

The sand hills of Santa Rosa afford good, well-protected bayous or approaches, along which material, men, horses, and artillery can be moved, properly protected from all direct and enfilading fire by works of very small extent, needed only to close a few gaps and to cut through a few ridges. An approach should be constructed across the open space at the foot of the glacis, and I think that a gallery through the glacis into the ditch may be advisable. I think that a gateway might be cut with advantage through the south entrance. I save the hauling of material and the hoisting of gun carriages over the ramparts. This gate, too, not being exposed to the direct fire of the opposing batteries, will not tempt an insubordinate, undisciplined volunteer to fire the shot which will open the war.

The three 10-inch mortars brought from Key West and some other pieces of artillery I think might be well placed in battery outside the fort. The division of these batteries will divide the enemy’s fire, and thus lessen its destructive effect. The mortars, being reserved to throw out light and fire balls from the fort, may be placed behind one of the sand ridges in position to bombard the navy-yard and its batteries. Here the mortar battery would be protected by the guns of Pickens. The light battery and a large portion, say two-thirds, of the garrison I think should be placed in an intrenched camp in the woods where the horses landed. Here they could be without the range of the batteries on the mainland. They would occupy then five miles of the island. A plank road, with natural epaulement on east side, would afford plenty of communication. This communication would be protected by the guns of the fleet, which should be moved in position, and which could destroy any enemy attempting to cut it off.

Vedettes and sentinels upon the ridge could keep up constant communication between the fort and the intrenched camp. Captain Barry will undertake it, as a boat expedition shall land in face of his guns. The working party and guard, detailed for twenty-four hours’ duty, should be kept in the fort to protect the provisions and ammunition there deposited, to work the guns, and repel a sudden assault should the enemy be rash enough to undertake one. The troops in camp and in fort would be healthy, not exposed to fire or too hard worked, and I think that all would be more cheerful, more comfortable, and more safe. The present crowded condition of the fort will, if it continues, bring on disease that in even a not crowded place will be destructive.

I have thrown these ideas, the fruit of much reflection upon this subject, together, colonel, for your consideration, and hope they will prove worthy of your approval and adoption. Upon you rests, of course, the responsibility which accompanies command, and I defer to your greater experience, rank, and responsibility, merely offering that advice which commends itself to my judgment.

I am, very truly, your friend and servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Captain of Engineers.

You know that tents for 1,000 men should be on the Illinois; that 10,000 yards of canvas afford means to cover the horses from sun and insects, and that ample stores of lumber, ordnance, provisions, &c., are here or on their way.

MONTGOMERY, April 19, 1861.

General BRAGG, Pensacola:

Events are such as to excite belief that demonstrations may be made upon you at an early day. I would, therefore, advise increased vigilance in preventing possible communication with the fleet or Fort Pickens. Martial law should be rigidly enforced. Everything is being done to send you guns and artillerists. We are badly off, however, especially in this latter particular.

L. P. WALKER.

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MONTGOMERY, April 19, 1861.

J. E. BROWN, Milledgeville:

Have just received your letter of the 18th instant.(*) You are mistaken about the fleet. It lies off Pensacola. Am willing to do anything necessary to defend Savannah and its approaches, but think you will concur in opinion that your suggestion is not now necessary. Pensacola and not Pulaski is the point. This is certain.

L. P. WALKER.

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MONTGOMERY, April 19, 1861.

General BRAGG, Pensacola:

Do you need for any purpose more troops than you have?

L. P. WALKER.

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MONTGOMERY, April 19, 1861.

General BEAUREGARD, Charleston:

Send to Pensacola the workman who planned and Captain Hamilton who superintended the construction of your floating battery. Hope you will do so at once. Mortars very much needed at Pensacola, and I hope you will send as many as possible, and without delay.

L. P. WALKER.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 19, 1861.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War:

SIR: I inclose the copy of a letter from Captain Hunt, dated Key West, April 11, which you may think advisable to lay before the Secretary of the Navy. I may be permitted to add that the danger is a real one that Captain Hunt specifies, namely, the landing of a considerable body of hostile troops on the shore of that island, out of reach of the guns of Fort Taylor. This the fort and its garrison can in no degree prevent. If landed with heavy artillery this force may reduce the fort by siege, because as yet that part of the structure that is to cover its walls from land batteries has not been built, nor can it be erected so as to fulfill its object for a year or more.

In the mean time complete security may be assured by small, quick-armed steamers stationed at Key West and cruising in its vicinity, provided other demands of the public service will permit the Navy Department to supply such protection.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Brevet Brigadier-General.

[Inclosure.]

FORT TAYLOR, KEY WEST, FLA., April 11, 1861.

General J. G. TOTTEN, Chief Engineer, Washington, D.C.:

SIR: It will probably be known ere this time if there is reason to anticipate any active demonstration by the C. S. Army to secure possession of this work. With the probability of such an occurrence will come the duty of defeating or preventing it by anticipatory measures. It is not for me to speculate on this probability, but if it does exist it cannot be amiss for me to ask attention to the defensive problem which would then arise. I shall do this, although perfectly aware of your acquaintance with the case, and strongly hoping that a peaceful possession by the United States of this line of keys may be assured. Supererogation can be no crime in this instance.

If there is any likelihood now of a large demonstration to take this place, measures should at once be taken to prevent the landing of forces and munitions on the part of the key beyond the range of Fort Taylor guns. This landing can be made without difficulty unless something more is done, and thus regular siege can be laid to the fort. This ought to be prevented, as it can most readily by maintaining an excess of naval force. The only good landing places not commanded by our guns are along the east portion of the south beach. You will see the landing even of a siege train there would be quite practicable if left undisturbed. But if two or three naval vessels, steamers being best, of course, are stationed along the south beach at points near the shore, say one-half mile, there is enough water, and they could cover all this line by their fires, and could also watch for any rendezvous of an attacking force in the vicinity. The same result can be attained by establishing two or three batteries along that shore and having the forces stationed here increased by several hundred men. The landing of men in boats would be quite practicable with such rapidity as to speedily outnumber the permanent garrison of the key, and, indeed, I see nothing to hinder putting several thousand ashore almost before the landing is suspected. This, however, would be made an entirely fruitless operation if our naval strength and distribution were such as to make the landing of stores and munitions impracticable, and the capture of the transport fleet certain. Along the north side the water is quite shoal, and a landing of men or stores could only be made by boats or scows of light draught, and, indeed, on the south beach scows would be the landing agency for stores.

You will at once see that if we are kept restrained by a superior field force suddenly landed, the debarkation could go on if no naval interference interrupts it. Open batteries could hardly be held against the assault of superior numbers, and might be turned by landing on the north side through Boca Chica or more eastern channels.

Thus, unless we have a force superior to any likely to be landed, open batteries would be rather unsafe reliances. By using abatis, &c., some power of resistance could be given to such defensive batteries, and they might be useful adjuncts. But the best and safest reliance is in a naval cordon and reef cruisers to cut up any expedition by the roots, and forbid it any foothold on this island. Our Navy, being at once available, could crush out any demonstration and annihilate the fleet of transports on which reliance would be placed as the base of operations. The combination of a larger land artillery force with naval strength would be the same basis of defense, and this would afford the needed watch and give a chance of forming a line across the key east of the salt-house. I might discuss the strategy of the case much more, but it can hardly be needful. I should mention that the necessity of using steamers for dispatch boats in case of siege should be duly considered. Without this resource we might be for a long time shut up without information being conveyed. Whether the Havana and New York boats could be relied on then is to be doubted. On the whole, the main question is this: Are we in any danger of siege? If so, landing should be made impracticable or useless by such a concentration of force here as to control the east end of the key or to cut off all chance of landing a siege train and supplies. The attempt to use light-draught steamers to operate out of reach of naval vessels on the north side is to be considered and duly obviated.

I have been obliged to write this in haste. I do not suppose you will need to be reminded of the points considered, but it is better that I should omit nothing which might be thought my duty, should these considerations chance not to have been entertained.

Mr. Mallory wrote here, I have been told, by a recent mail, that when the C. S. Army were ready, an attempt to take these works would be made, but I do not believe this would be tried were our assured strength such as to contest the debarkation.

I am glad to say that from what I have heard to-day the secessionists here have essentially given in and are beginning to see the error of their ways. Judge Marvin has at last been induced, I believe, to hold on to his place, and I trust that all conflict of jurisdictions will now be avoided. It is surmised that Judge McIntosh may conclude not to come here at all.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

E. B. HUNT,
Captain of Engineers.

P. S.–Judge Marvin feels sure he will be here by the next boat, April 21. I suppose the shadow of destiny begins to show too clearly for further doubt. I think a turning point is passed, and “submission” to their former peace and quiet will, I hope, replace the rule of bad passions.

The main question is to be decided by the United States once for all, and I do not doubt that this decision is already made.

P. S.–The yellow fever is to be considered in sending men here, acclimation being very important. Crowding a large force on the key will endanger its appearance in a destructive type, and if acclimated crews and troops can be sent this would be a great safeguard.