July 6th. I was present at an interesting conversation between General French and Zook, regarding the campaign just closed. Both of them admitted it had been a complete failure, in spite of the gallant and meritorious conduct of the troops. From the time the army first started for Manassas, until the second day of July, its movements, except in retreat, have been timid, vacillating, and indecisive. In no instance has it initiated the fighting, although organized for that purpose. When attacked, it has shown itself capable of great deeds, and has invariably succeeded in defeating its opponent, but never was allowed to take advantage of the fact. Upon landing before Yorktown, that stronghold could, as is well known now, have been captured by a coup-de-main, with almost no loss, the enemy being in small force, and wholly unprepared for defence. That plan, however, never seems to have occurred to the general commanding, his brain being filled with the idea of a great siege, like Sebastopol, in the Crimea. Having decided on the siege, everything else was neglected and the slow, laborious operation of digging entrenchments, and erecting batteries went along just as in the sieges of the Middle Ages, every one taking his time, and only careful to do things regularly. When the enemy evacuated the place, through lack of alertness on our part, they were able to move everything of value, and make an orderly and secure retreat, not a single wagon being abandoned. The advance and operations at Williamsburg were of the most perfunctory order, ill advised, indifferently carried out, and wholly without result. While the general commanding ostensibly undertook to cut off part of the enemy’s force at West Point, or near there, the movements of the Army of the Potomac were so sluggish that the enemy easily got out of the way. Our army met with no resistance on the advance to West Point, and yet was nearly ten days in getting there. The advance from the White House to the Chickahominy was extraordinarily slow and hesitating, the troops not averaging more than five miles a day. Arriving at the Chickahominy, the grave military error of isolating a part of the army by a treacherous and difficult stream, was inexcusable, and has lost us much prestige. On the first of June everything was propitious, the army concentrated, the men anxious for a trial of their strength, and all abundantly supplied. At the very outset we forgot our plans; our theory, and our duty, and instead of taking the initiative with the combined army, and attacking the enemy, we awaited his attack and contented ourselves throughout the entire day with simply repulsing his efforts and holding our ground. Was there ever so great a miscarriage before? That a general attack would have resulted in success, and possibly an overwhelming victory, was the opinion of almost every officer in the field with whom I talked. But the general commanding seemed to be satisfied with holding his ground. Why we should have remained at Fair Oaks passes understanding. If we could not advance and attack advantageously, on the first of June, how could we do so subsequently, when the enemy had fortified himself? Fortifying ourselves on the southern, or right bank of the Chickahominy, we remained constantly under fire, powerless and inactive. How long this state of things would have lasted, had not the enemy renewed the fighting, is hard to guess. Gaines’ Mills afforded one more capital chance for carrying out our plans. The enemy concentrated his army, and made a powerful attack on our right, a formidable position, which might have been held had troops enough been sent to support Porter’s command, but in arranging for their attack, the enemy withdrew nearly all his troops in front of Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzleman’s splendid corps, which lay inactive behind impregnable earthworks. As we knew, at least in front of our corps negroes were marched about their lines, beating drums, and making a noise, to deceive us with the belief that the troops were still there. Zook ascertained they were not there, and begged for permission to attack. If late in the afternoon, when Lee was concentrating all his forces, and pushing the fighting against Porter’s corps, Sumner had made a dash for the works in front, they would certainly have been carried, and our advance moved to within shelling distance of Richmond, which would have been a position worth obtaining. In any case, we should inevitably have drawn off the force attacking Porter, and probably had the chance to fight them in rear of their own works. Admitting the retreat was conducted superbly, the general’s Fourth of July address to the contrary, there was an immense amount of all kinds of material destroyed. At Savage Station, while we lay there, a heavy train loaded with stores, was set on fire and sent under full headway over the burning bridge across the Chickahominy, to plunge headlong into the stream, where all was absolutely destroyed. The fight at Malvern Hill was entirely favorable to our side, the enemy lost enormously, while we suffered very little, and at the close of the fight, the rebel troops were dispirited and thoroughly exhausted; our corps, and the troops on the right were mostly fresh, excepting two brigades of our division. If a grand attack in force, of the entire army, well led, had been ordered immediately after the repulse of the enemy’s last attack, who can doubt the result? But the same timid methods continued and the army was withdrawn, exactly as though it had sustained an overwhelming defeat. With such a commander, we can’t hope for success, at least in anything more than a defensive warfare. Such certainly is the opinion of a great many of our brightest officers.
